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Abstract
We take a critical look at the relationship between the security of cryptographic schemes in
the Random Oracle Model, and the security of the schemes that result from implementing the
random oracle by so called “cryptographic hash functions”.
The main result of this paper is a negative one: There exist signature and encryption schemes
that are secure in the Random Oracle Model, but for which any implementation of the random
oracle results in insecure schemes.
In the process of devising the above schemes, we consider possible definitions for the notion
of a “good implementation” of a random oracle, pointing out limitations and challenges.
Keywords: Correlation Intractability,
• Cryptography (Encryption and Signature Schemes, The Random Oracle model);
• Complexity Theory (diagonalization, application of CS-Proofs).
∗Extended abstract has appeared in the Proc. of the 30th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages
209–218, 1998.
†IBM Watson, P.O. Box 704, Yorktown Height, NY 10598, USA. E-mail: canetti@watson.ibm.com
‡Department of Computer Science, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel. E-mail:
oded@wisdom.weizmann.ac.il. Work done while visiting LCS, MIT. Partially supported by DARPA grant DABT63-
96-C-0018.
§IBM Watson, P.O. Box 704, Yorktown Height, NY 10598, USA. E-mail: shaih@watson.ibm.com
1
1 Introduction
A popular methodology for designing cryptographic protocols consists of the following two steps.
One first designs an ideal system in which all parties (including the adversary) have oracle access
to a truly random function, and proves the security of this ideal system. Next, one replaces the
random oracle by a “good cryptographic hashing function” (such as MD5 or SHA), providing all
parties (including the adversary) with a succinct description of this function. Thus, one obtains
an implementation of the ideal system in a “real-world” where random oracles do not exist. This
methodology, explicitly formulated by Bellare and Rogaway [1] and hereafter referred to as the
random oracle methodology, has been used in many works (see, for example, [9, 28, 17, 25, 1, 21, 2,
26]).
Although the random oracle methodology seems to be useful in practice, it is unclear how to put
this methodology on firm grounds. One can indeed make clear statements regarding the operation
of the ideal system, but it is not clear what happens when one replaces the random oracle by a
function that has a succinct description available to all parties. What one would have liked is (at
least a definition of) a class of functions that, when used to replace the random oracle, maintains
the security of the ideal scheme. The purpose of this work is to point out fundamental difficulties in
proceeding towards this goal. We demonstrate that the traditional approach of providing a single
robust definition that supports a wide range of applications is bound to fail. That is, one cannot
expect to see definitions such as of pseudorandom generators or functions [3, 29, 13], and general
results of the type saying that these can be used in any application in which parties are restricted
merely by computing resources. Specifically, we identify a specific property of the random oracle,
that seems to capture one aspect of the random oracle methodology (and in particular seems to
underline heuristics such as the Fiat–Shamir transformation of a three-round identification scheme
into a signature scheme in the [9]). We show that even a minimalistic formulation of this property,
called correlation intractability, cannot be obtained by any fully specified function (or function
ensemble).
To demonstrate the implications of the above to the security of cryptographic systems, we show
that systems whose security relies on the “correlation intractability” of their oracle may be secure in
the Random Oracle Model, and yet be insecure when implemented using any fully specified function
(or function ensemble). In particular, we describe schemes for digital signatures and public-key
encryption that are secure in the Random Oracle Model, but for which any implementation yields
insecure schemes. This refutes the belief that a security proof in the Random Oracle Model means
that there are no “structural flaws” in the scheme.
1.1 The Setting
For the purpose of the following discussion, a cryptographic system consists of a set of parties,
which are modeled by probabilistic polynomial time interactive Turing machines. A cryptographic
application comes with a security requirement specifying the adversary’s abilities and when the latter
is considered successful. The abilities of the adversary include its computational power (typically,
an arbitrary polynomial-time machine) and the ways in which it can interact with the other parties.
The success of the adversary is defined by means of a predetermined polynomial-time predicate of
the application’s global view.1 A system is considered secure if any adversary with the given abilities
has only a negligible probability of success.
1 The application’s global view consists of the initial inputs of all the parties (including the adversary), their
internal coin tosses, and all the messages which were exchanged among them.
1
1.1.1 The Random Oracle Model
In a scheme that operates in the Random Oracle Model, all parties (including the adversary) interact
with one another as usual interactive machines, but in addition they can make oracle queries. It is
postulated that all oracle queries, regardless of the identity of the party making them, are answered
by a single function, denoted O, that is uniformly selected among all possible functions. The set
of possible functions is determined by a length function, ℓout(·), and by the security parameter of
the system. Specifically, given security parameter k we consider functions mapping {0, 1}poly(k)
to {0, 1}ℓout(k). A set of interactive oracle machines as above corresponds to an ideal system for
one specific application. Security of an ideal system is defined as usual. That is, an ideal system
is considered secure if any adversary with the given abilities (including oracle access) has only a
negligible probability of success. Here the probability is taken also over the choices of the random
oracle.
1.1.2 Implementing an ideal system
Loosely speaking, by “implementing” a particular ideal system we mean using an easy-to-evaluate
function f instead of the random oracle. That is, whenever the ideal system queries the oracle
with a value x, the implementation instead evaluates f(x). Formally defining this notion, however,
takes some care. Below we briefly examine (and discard of) the notion of implementation by a
single function, and then present the notion of implementation by a function ensemble, which is
the notion we use throughout the paper.
Implementation by a single function. In accordance with the above discussion, each ideal
system (for some specific application), Π, is transformed into a real system (for the same applica-
tion) by transforming each interactive oracle machine, into a standard interactive machine in the
natural manner. That is, each oracle call is replaced by the evaluation of a fixed function f on the
corresponding query.2
The above system is called an implementation of Π using function f . The adversary, attacking
this implementation, may mimic the behavior of the adversary of the ideal system, by evaluating
f at arguments of its choice, but it needs not do so. In particular, it may obtain some global
insight into the structure of the function f , and use this insight towards its vicious goals. An
implementation is called secure if any adversary attacking it may succeed only with negligible
probability, where the success event is defined exactly as in the ideal system (i.e., it is defined by
the same polynomial-time computable predicate of the application’s global view).
Using this notion of an implementation, we would like to say that a function f is a “good
implementation of a random oracle” if for any ideal system Π, security of Π implies security of
the implementation of Π using f . It is very easy to see, however, that no (single) polynomial-
time computable function can provide a good implementation of a random oracle. Consider, for
example, a candidate function f . Then, a (contrived) application for which f does not provide
a good implementation consists of an oracle machine (representing an honest party) that upon
receiving a message m, makes query m to the oracle and reveals its private input if the oracle
answers with f(m). Suppose that the adversary is deemed successful whenever the honest party
reveals its private input. Clearly, this ideal system is secure (in the Random Oracle Model),
2 Formally, the function f also takes as input the security parameter k, so that the function fk(·)
def
= f(k, ·) maps
{0, 1}poly(k) to {0, 1}ℓout(k).
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since the random oracle will return the value f(m) only with negligible probability; however, its
implementation using f is certainly not secure.
Implementation by a function ensemble. In face of the failure of the above naive attempt,
a more sophisticated interpretation is indeed called for. Here one considers the substitution of the
random oracle by a function randomly selected from a collection of functions. In this setting, we
have a “system set-up” phase, in which the function is selected once and for all, and its description
is available to all parties.3 After this set-up phase, this function is used in place of the random
oracle just as above. A little more precisely, we consider a function ensemble F = {Fk|k ∈ N},
where
Fk = {fs :{0, 1}
poly(k)→{0, 1}ℓout(k)}s∈{0,1}k ,
such that there exists a polynomial time algorithm that, on input s and x, returns fs(x). The
implementation of an ideal system, Π, by the function ensemble F is obtained as follows. On
security parameter k, we uniformly select s ∈ {0, 1}k , and make s available to all parties including
the adversary. Given this initialization phase, we replace each oracle call of an interactive oracle
machine by the evaluation of the function fs on the corresponding query. The resulting system is
called an implementation of Π using function ensemble F .
Again, the adversary may (but need not necessarily) mimic the behavior of the adversary in
the Random Oracle Model by evaluating fs at arguments of its choice. Such a real system is
called secure if any adversary attacking it has only a negligible probability of success, where the
probability is taken over the random choice of s as well as the coins of all the parties. As before, we
would like to say that an ensemble F provides a “good implementation of a random oracle” if for
every ideal system Π, if Π is secure then so is the implementation of Π using F . Notice that in this
case, the contrived example from above does not work anymore, since the success event must be
independent of the random choice of s. Nonetheless, this work implies that no function ensemble
can provide a good implementation of a random oracle. We elaborate in the next subsection.
1.2 Our Results
1.2.1 Correlation intractability.
One property we certainly expect from a good implementation of a random oracle is that it should
be infeasible to find inputs to the function that stand in some “rare” relationship with the cor-
responding outputs. Indeed, many applications of the random-oracle methodology (such as the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic) assume that it is infeasible to find an input-output pair that stands in a
particular relations induced by the application. Trying to formulate this property, we may require
that given the description of the function it is hard to find a sequence of preimages that together
with their images (under this function) satisfy some given relation. Clearly, this can only hold for
relations for which finding such sequences is hard in the Random Oracle Model. That is, if it is
hard to find a sequence of preimages that together with their images under a random oracle satisfy
relation R, then given the description of a “good” function fs it should be hard to find a sequence
of preimages that together with their images under fs satisfy R.
In fact, we mainly consider the task of finding a single preimage that together with its image
satisfies some property. Loosely speaking, a relation is called evasive if when given access to a
random oracle O, it is infeasible to find a string x so that the pair (x,O(x)) is in the relation. (For
3 In the sequel we consider examples of public key signature and encryption schemes. In these schemes, the
initialization (set-up) step is combined with the key-generation step of the original scheme.
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instance, the relation {(x, 0ℓout(k)) : x ∈ {0, 1}∗} is evasive. The relation {(x, 0y) : x ∈ {0, 1}∗, y ∈
{0, 1}ℓout(k)−1} is not.) A function ensemble F (as above) is called correlation intractable if for every
evasive relation, given the description of a uniformly selected function fs ∈ Fk it is infeasible to
find an x such that (x, fs(x)) is in the relation. We show that
Informal Theorem 1.1 There exist no correlation intractable function ensembles.
Restricted correlation intractability. The proof of the above negative result relies on the fact
that the description of the function is shorter than its input. Thus we also investigate the case
where one restricts the function fs to inputs whose length is less than the length of s. We show
that the negative result can be extended to the case where the function description is shorter than
the sum of the lengths of the input and output of the function. (Furthermore, if one generalizes
the notion of correlation intractability to relations on sequences of inputs and outputs, then the
negative result holds as long as the total length of all the inputs and outputs is more than the length
of the function description.) This still leaves open the possibility that there exist function ensembles
that are correlation intractable with respect to input-output sequences of a-priori bounded total
length. See further discussion in Section 5.
1.2.2 Failure of the Random Oracle Methodology
Upon formulating the random oracle methodology, Bellare and Rogaway did warn that a proof
of security in the Random Oracle Model should not be taken as guarantee to the security of
implementations (in which the Random Oracle is replaced by functions such as MD5) [1]. However,
it is widely believed that a security proof in the Random Oracle Model means that there are no
“structural flaws” in the scheme. That is, any attack against an implementation of this scheme
must take advantage of specific flaws in the function that is used to implement the oracle. In this
work we demonstrate that these beliefs are false. Specifically, we show that
Informal Theorem 1.2 There exists encryption and signature schemes that are secure in the
Random Oracle Model, but have no secure implementation in the real model (where a Ran-
dom Oracle does not exist). That is, implementing these secure ideal schemes, using any function
ensemble, results in insecure schemes.
The encryption and signature schemes presented to prove Theorem 1.2 are “unnatural”. We do not
claim (or even suggest) that a statement as above holds with respect to schemes presented in the
literature. Still, the lesson is that the mere fact that a scheme is secure in the Random Oracle Model
does not necessarily imply that a particular implementation of it (in the real world) is secure, or
even that this scheme does not have any “structural flaws”. Furthermore, unless otherwise justified,
such ideal scheme may have no secure implementations at all.
In fact, our techniques are quite general and can be applied to practically any cryptographic
application. That is, given an ideal cryptographic application A, we can construct an ideal cryp-
tographic application A′ such that A′ is just as secure as A (in the Random Oracle Model), but
A′ has no secure implementation. Hence, in this sense, security of an ideal system in the Random
Oracle Model is a bad predictor of the security of an implementation of the system in real life.
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1.3 Techniques
Our proof of Theorem 1.2 uses in an essential way non-interactive CS-proofs (in the Random
Oracle Model), as defined and constructed by Micali [21].4 Interestingly, we only use the fact
that non-interactive CS-proofs exist in the Random Oracle Model, and do not care whether or not
these ideal CS-proofs have an implementation using any function ensembles (nor if non-interactive
CS-proofs exists at all outside of the Random Oracle Model). Specifically, CS-proofs are used to
“effectively verify” any polynomial-time verifiable statement within time that is bounded by one
fixed polynomial. Furthermore, we use the fact that the definition of CS-proofs guarantees that the
complexity of generating such proofs is polynomial in the time required for ordinary verification.
See further discussion in Section 2.2.
1.4 Related Work
Correlation intractability. Our definition of correlation-intractability is related to a definition
by Okamoto [25]. Using our terminology, Okamoto considers function ensembles for which it is
infeasible to form input-output relations with respect to a specific evasive relation [25, Def. 19]
(rather than all such relations). He uses the assumption that such function ensembles exists, for a
specific evasive relation in [25, Thm. 20].
Special-purpose properties of the Random Oracle Model. First steps in the direction
of identifying and studying useful special-purpose properties of the Random Oracle Model have
been taken by Canetti [4]. Specifically, Canetti considered a property called “perfect one-wayness”,
provided a definition of this property, constructions which possess this property (under some rea-
sonable assumptions), and applications for which such functions suffice. Additional constructions
have been suggested by Canetti, Micciancio and Reingold [6]. Another context where specific prop-
erties of the random oracle where captured and realized is the signature scheme of Gennaro, Halevi
and Rabin [10].
Relation to Zero-Knowledge proofs. Following the preliminary version of the current work [5],
Hada and Tanaka observed that the existence of even restricted correlation intractable functions
(in the non uniform model) would be enough to prove that 3-round auxiliary-input zero-knowledge
AM proof systems only exist for languages in BPP [18]. (Recall that auxiliary-input zero-knowledge
is seemingly weaker than black-box zero-knowledge, and so the result of [18] is incomparable to
prior work of Goldreich and Krawczyk [14] that showed that constant-round auxiliary-input zero-
knowledge AM proof systems only exist for languages in BPP.)
Relation to “magic functions”. More recently, Dwork et. al. investigated the notion of “magic
functions”, which is related to our correlation intractable functions [8]. Like correlation intractabil-
ity, the definition of “magic functions” is motivated by the quest to capture the properties that are
required from the hash function in the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. Correlation intractability seems like
a general and natural property, but is not known to be either necessary or sufficient for the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic (which is a special case of the random oracle methodology). In contrast, “magic
functions” are explicitly defined as “functions that make the Fiat-Shamir heuristic work”. In their
4 The underlying ideas of Micali’s construction [21] can be traced to Kilian’s construction [20] and to the Fiat–
Shamir transformation [9] (which is sound in the Random Oracle Model).
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paper [8], Dwork et. al. demonstrated a relation between “magic functions” and 3-round zero-
knowledge, which is similar to the relation between correlation intractability and zero-knowledge
exhibited in [18]. Specifically, they showed that the existence of “magic functions” implies the
non-existence of some kind of 3-round zero-knowledge proof systems, as well as a weakened version
of a converse theorem.
1.5 Organization
Section 2 presents syntax necessary for the rest of the paper as well as review the definition of CS-
proofs. Section 3 discusses the reasoning that led us to define the correlation intractability property,
and prove that even such a minimalistic definition cannot be met by a function ensemble. Section 4
presents our main negative results – demonstrating the existence of secure ideal signature and
encryption schemes that do not have secure implementations. Restricted correlation intractability
is defined and studied in Section 5. Three different perspectives on the results obtained in this
paper are presented in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
We consider probability spaces defined over executions of probabilistic machines. Typically, we
consider the probability that an output generated by one machine M1 satisfies a condition that
involves the execution of a second machine M2. For example, we denote by Pr[y ← M1(x) , |y|=
|x|&M2(y)=1] the probability that on input x, machine M1 outputs a string that has length |x|
and is accepted by machine M2. That is, y in the above notation represents a random variable that
may be assigned arbitrary values in {0, 1}∗, conditions are made regarding this y, and we consider
the probability that these conditions are satisfied when y is distributed according to M1(x).
2.1 Function Ensembles
To make the discussion in the Introduction more precise, we explicitly associate a length function,
ℓout : N→N, with the output of the random oracle and its candidate implementations. We always
assume that the length functions are super-logarithmic and polynomially bounded (i.e. ω(log k) ≤
ℓout(k) ≤ poly(k)). We refer to an oracle with length function ℓout as an ℓout-oracle. On security
parameter k, each answer of the oracle is a string of length ℓout(k). A candidate implementation
of a random ℓout-oracle is an ℓout-ensemble as defined below.
Definition 2.1 (function ensembles) Let ℓout : N→N be a length function. An ℓout-ensemble is
a sequence F = {Fk}k∈N of families of functions, Fk = {fs : {0, 1}
∗→{0, 1}ℓout(k)}s∈{0,1}k , so that
the following holds
Length requirement. For every s ∈ {0, 1}k and every x ∈ {0, 1}∗, |fs(x)| = ℓout(k).
Efficiency requirement. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm Eval so that for every s, x ∈
{0, 1}∗, it holds that Eval(s, x) = fs(x).
In the sequel we often call s the description or the seed of the function fs.
Remark 2.2 The length of the seed in the above definition serves as a “security parameter” and
is meant to control the “quality” of the implementation. It is important to note that although fs(·)
is syntactically defined on every input, in a cryptographic applications it is only used on inputs of
length at most poly(|s|). We stress that all results presented in this paper refer to such usage.
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Remark 2.3 One may even envision applications in which a more stringent condition on the
use of fs holds. Specifically, one may require that the function fs be only applied to inputs of
length at most ℓin(|s|), where ℓin : N→N is a specific (polynomially bounded) length function (e.g.,
ℓin(k) = 2k). We discuss the effects of making such a stringent requirement in Section 5.
2.2 CS Proofs
Our construction of signature and encryption schemes that are secure in the Random Oracle Model
but not in the “real world” uses CS-proofs as defined and constructed by Micali [21]. Below, we
briefly recall the relevant definitions and results.
A CS-proof system consists of a prover, Prv, that is trying to convince a verifier, Ver, of the
validity of an assertion of the type machine M accepts input x within t steps.5 The central feature
of CS-proofs is that the running-time of the prover on input x is (polynomially) related to the
actual running time of M(x) rather than to the global upper bound t; furthermore, the verifier’s
running-time is poly-logarithmic related to t. (These conditions are expressed in the additional
efficiency requirements in Definition 2.4 below.)
In our context, we use non-interactive CS-proofs that work in the Random Oracle Model; that
is, both prover and verifier have access to a common random oracle. The prover generates an alleged
proof that is examined by the verifier. A construction for such CS-proofs was presented by Mi-
cali [21], using ideas that can be traced to Kilian’s construction [20], and requires no computational
assumptions. Following is the formulation of CS-proofs, as defined in [21].
In the formulation below, the security parameter k is presented in unary to both parties, whereas
the global time bound t is presented in unary to the prover and in binary to the verifier. This allows
the (polynomial-time) prover to run in time polynomial in t, whereas the (polynomial-time) verifier
may only run in time that is poly-logarithmic in t. (Observe that it is not required that t is bounded
above by a polynomial in |x|. In fact, in our arguments, we shall use a slightly super-polynomial
function t (i.e., t(n) = nlogn).) Finally, we mention that both the prover and the verifier in the
definition below are required to be deterministic machines. See some discussion in Remark 2.6
below.
Definition 2.4 (Non-interactive CS proofs in the Random Oracle Model) A CS-proof sys-
tem consists of two (deterministic) polynomial-time oracle machines, a prover Prv and a verifier
Ver, which operate as follows:
• On input (1k, 〈M〉, x, 1t) and access to an oracle O, the prover computes a proof π = PrvO(1k, 〈M〉, x, 1t)
such that |π| = poly(k, |〈M〉|, |x|, log t).
• On input (1k, 〈M〉, x, t, π), with t encoded in binary, and access to O, the verifier decides
whether to accept or reject the proof π (i.e., VerO(1k, 〈M〉, x, t, π) ∈ {accept, reject}).
The proof system satisfies the following conditions, where the probabilities are taken over the random
choice of the oracle O:
Perfect completeness: For any M,x, t such that machine M accepts the string x within t steps, and
for any k,
Pr
O
[
π ← PrvO(1k, 〈M〉, x, 1t),
Ver
O(1k, 〈M〉, x, t, π) = accept
]
= 1
5 When t is presented in binary, such valid assertions form a complete language for the class (deterministic)
exponential time.
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Computational soundness: For any polynomial time oracle machine Bad and any input w =
(〈M〉, x, 1t) such that M does not accepts x within t steps, it holds that
Pr
O
[
π ← BadO(1k, 〈M〉, x, 1t),
Ver
O(1k, 〈M〉, x, t, π) = accept
]
≤
poly(k + |w|)
2k
Additional efficiency conditions:6 The running-time of the prover Prv on input (1k, 〈M〉, x, 1t) is
(polynomially) related to the actual running time of M(x), rather than to the global upper
bound t. That is, there exists a fixed polynomial p(·), such that
T
PRV
(
1k, 〈M〉, x, 1t
)
≤ p(k,min{t, TM (x)})
where TA(x) denotes the running time of machine A on input x.
Remark 2.5 (Oracle output length) The above definition does not specify the output length
of the oracle (i.e., the length of the answers to the oracle queries). In some cases it is convenient
to identify this output length with the security parameter, but in many case we do not follow this
convention (e.g., in Proposition 2.8 below). In any case, it is trivial to implement an oracle with
one output length given an oracle with different output length, so we allow ourselves to ignore this
issue.
Remark 2.6 (Deterministic verifier) Recall that Definition 2.4 mandates that both the prover
and verifier are deterministic. Indeed this deviates from the tradition (in this area) of allowing
the verifier to be probabilistic; but Micali’s construction (in the Random Oracle Model) happens
to employ a deterministic verifier (cf. [21]). This issue is not essential to our main results, but
plays an important role in the proof of Proposition 5.7 (due to K. Nissim). We note that when
working in the Random Oracle Model (and only caring about completeness and soundness), one may
assume without loss of generality that the prover is deterministic (because it can obtain adequate
randomness by querying the oracle). This does not hold with respect to the verifier, since its coin
tosses must be unknown to the prover.
Theorem 2.7 (Micali [21]) There exists a non-interactive CS proof system in the Random Oracle
Model.
For the proof of our construction (Theorem 4.4), we will need a different soundness condition
than the one from above. Specifically, we need to make sure that given the machine M (and the
complexity bound t), it is hard to find any pair (x, π) such that M does not accept x within t
steps and yet Ver will accept π as a valid CS-proof to the contrary. One way to obtain this
soundness property from the original one, is by postulating that when the verifier is given a proof
for an assertion w = (〈M〉, x, t), it uses security parameter k + |w| (rather than just k). Using a
straightforward counting argument we get:
6 By the above, the running time of Prv on input (1k, 〈M〉, x, 1t) is at most poly(k, |〈M〉|, |x|, t), whereas the
running time of Ver on input (1k, 〈M〉, x, t, π) is at most poly(k, |〈M〉|, |x|, |π|, log t). The following condition provide
even lower running time bound for the prover.
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Proposition 2.8 Let (Prv,Ver) be a CS proof system. Then for every polynomial time oracle
machine Bad, there exists a polynomial q(·), such that for every k it holds that
ǫbad(k)
def
= Pr
O

 (π,w)← Bad
O(1k), where w = (〈M〉, x, t),
s.t. machine M does not accept x within t steps
and yet VerO(1k+|w|, w, π) = accept

 ≤ q(k)
2k
3 Correlation Intractability
In this section we present and discuss the difficulty of defining the intuitive requirement that a
function ensemble “behaves like a random oracle” even when its description is given. In particular,
we show that even some minimalistic definitions cannot be realized.
An obvious failure. We first comment that an obvious maximalistic definition, which amount
to adopting the pseudorandom requirement of [13], fails poorly. That is, we cannot require that
an (efficient) algorithm that is given the description of the function cannot distinguish its input-
output behavior from the one of a random function, because the function description determines
its input-output behavior.
Towards a minimalistic definition. Although we cannot require the value of a fully specified
function to be “random”, we may still be able to require that it has some “unpredictability prop-
erties”. For example, we may require that, given a description of a family and a function chosen
at random from a this family, it is hard to find two preimages that the function maps to the same
image. Indeed, this sound definition coincides with the well-known collision-intractability property
[7]. Trying to generalize, we may replace the “equality of images” relation by any other relation
among the pre-images and images of the function. Namely, we would like to say that an ensemble
is correlation intractable if for any relation, given the description of a randomly chosen function,
it is infeasible to find a sequence of preimages that together with their images satisfy this relation.
This requirement, however, is still unreasonably strong since there are relations that are easy to
satisfy even in the Random Oracle Model. We therefore restrict the above infeasibility requirement
by saying that it holds only with respect to relations that are hard to satisfy in the Random Oracle
Model. That is, if it is hard to find a sequence of preimages that together with their images under
a random function satisfy relation R, then given the description of a randomly chosen function fs
it should be hard to find a sequence of preimages that together with their images under fs satisfy
R.
This seems to be a minimalistic notion of correlation intractable ensemble of functions, yet we
show below that no ensemble can satisfy it. In fact, in the definition below we only consider the
task of finding a single preimage that together with its image satisfies some property. Namely,
instead of considering all possible relations, we only consider binary ones. Since we are showing
impossibility result, this syntactic restriction only strengthens the result.
3.1 Actual Definitions
We start with a formal definition of a relation that is hard to satisfy in the random oracle model.
Definition 3.1 (Evasive Relations) A binary relation R is said to be evasive with respect to
length function ℓout if for any probabilistic polynomial time oracle machine M
Pr
O
[x←MO(1k), (x,O(x))∈R] = negl(k)
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where O : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}ℓout(k) is a uniformly chosen function and negl(·) is a negligible function.7
A special case of evasive relations consists of R’s for which there exists a negligible function negl(·)
so that for all k
max
x∈{0,1}∗
{
Pr
y∈{0,1}ℓout(k)
[(x, y)∈R ]
}
= negl(k)
(All the binary relations used in the sequel falls into this category.) The reason such an R is evasive
is that any oracle machine, M , making at most poly(k) queries to a random O satisfies
Pr
O
[x←MO(1k), (x,O(x))∈R] ≤ poly(k) · max
x∈{0,1}∗
{ Pr
O
[(x,O(x))∈R] }
≤ poly(k) · negl(k)
We are now ready to state our minimalistic definition of a correlation intractable ensemble:
Definition 3.2 (Correlation intractability) Let ℓout : N → N be length function, and let F be
an ℓout-ensemble.
• Let R ⊆ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ be a binary relation. We say that F is correlation intractable with
respect to R if for every probabilistic polynomial-time machine M it holds that
Pr
s∈{0,1}k
[x←M(s), (x, fs(x)) ∈ R] = negl(k)
where negl(·) is a negligible function, and the probability is taken over the choice of s ∈ {0, 1}k
and the coins of M .
• We say that F is correlation intractable if it is correlation intractable with respect to every
evasive (w.r.t. ℓout) relation,
Remark 3.3 In the above definition we quantify over all evasive relations. A weaker notion, called
weak correlation intractability, is obtained by quantifying only over all polynomial-time recognizable
evasive relations (i.e., we only consider those relations R such that there exists a polynomial time
algorithm that, given (x, y), decides whether or not (x, y) ∈ R). In the sequel we consider both
notions.
3.2 Correlation-intractable ensembles do not exist
Theorem 3.4 There exist no correlation intractable ensembles, not even in the weak sense.
Proof: Let ℓout be a length function and let F = {fs} be an ℓout-ensemble. We define the binary
relation:
RF
def
=
⋃
k
{
(s, fs(s)) : s ∈ {0, 1}
k
}
(1)
Clearly, this relation is polynomial-time recognizable, since fs can be computed in polynomial
time. Also, the relation is evasive (w.r.t. ℓout) since for every x ∈ {0, 1}
∗ there is at most one
y ∈ {0, 1}ℓout(k) satisfying (x, y) ∈ RF , 8 and so
Pr
y
[(x, y) ∈ RF ] ≤ 2−ℓout(k) = 2−ω(log k) = negl(k) .
7 A function µ :N →R is negligible if for every positive polynomial p and all sufficiently large n’s, µ(n) < 1/p(n).
8 Such a y exists if and only if ℓout(|x|) = ℓout(k).
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On the other hand, consider the machine I that computes the identity function, I(x) = x for all x.
It violates the correlation intractability requirement, since for all k,
Pr
s∈{0,1}k
[(I(s), fs(I(s))) ∈ R
F ] = Pr
s∈{0,1}k
[(s, fs(s)) ∈ R
F ] = 1 .
In fact, since RF is polynomial-time recognizable, even the weak correlation intractability of F is
violated.
4 Failure of the Random Oracle Methodology
This section demonstrates that the security of a cryptographic scheme in the Random Oracle Model
does not always imply its security under some specific choice of a “good hash function” that is used
to implement the random oracle. To prove this statement we construct signature and encryption
schemes, which are secure in the Random Oracle Model, yet for which any implementation of the
random oracle yield insecure schemes. Put in other words, although the ideal scheme is secure, any
implementation of it is necessarily insecure.
The underlying idea is to start with a secure scheme (which may or may not use a random
oracle) and modify it to get a scheme that is secure in the Random Oracle Model, but such that its
security is easily violated when trying to replace the random oracle by any ensemble. This is done
by using evasive relations as constructed in Theorem 3.4. The modified scheme starts by trying
to find a preimage that together with its image yields a pair in the evasive relation. In case the
attempt succeeds, the scheme does something that is clearly insecure (e.g., output the secret key).
Otherwise, the scheme behaves as the original (secure) scheme does. The former case (i.e., finding
a pair in the relation) will occur rarely in the Random Oracle Model, thus the scheme will maintain
its security there. However, it will be easy for an adversary to make sure that the former case
always occurs under any implementation of the Random Oracle Model, thus no implementation
may be secure. We start with the case of a signature scheme, and present the construction in three
steps.
• In the first step we carry out the above idea in a naive way. This allows us to prove a weaker
statement, saying that for any function ensemble F , there exists a signature scheme that is
secure in the Random Oracle Model, but is not secure when implemented using F .
This, by itself, means that one cannot construct a function ensemble that provides secure
implementation of any cryptographic scheme that is secure in the Random Oracle Model.
But it does not rule out the possibility (ruled out below) that for any cryptographic scheme
that is secure in the Random Oracle Model there exists a secure implementation (via a
different function ensemble).
• In the second step we use diagonalization techniques to reverse the order of quantifiers.
Namely, we show that there exists a signature scheme that is secure in the Random Oracle
Model, but for which any implementation (using any function ensemble) results in an inse-
cure scheme. However, the scheme constructed in this step utilizes signing and verification
procedures that run in (slightly) super-polynomial time.
• In the third step we use CS-proofs [21] to get rid of the super-polynomial running-time (of
the legitimate procedures), hence obtaining a standard signature scheme that is secure in
the Random Oracle Model, but has no secure implementation. Specifically, in this step we
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use CS-proofs as a tool to “diagonalize against all polynomial-time ensembles in polynomial
time”. (As noted by Silvio Micali, this technique may be useful also in other settings where
diagonalization techniques are applied.)
The reader is referred to [16] for basic terminology regarding signature schemes and corresponding
notions of security. As a starting point for our constructions, we use a signature scheme, denoted
S = (G,S, V ), where G is the key-generation algorithm, S is the signing algorithm, and V is the
verification algorithm. We assume that the scheme (G,S, V ) is existentially unforgeable under
adaptive chosen message attack, in the Random Oracle Model. We do not need to rely on any com-
putational assumptions here, since one-way functions are sufficient for constructing secure signature
schemes [23, 27], and the random oracle can be used to implement one-way functions without any
assumptions.9
Conventions. In the three steps below we assume, without loss of generality, that the security
parameter (i.e., k) is implicit in the keys generated by G(1k). Also, let us fix some length function
ℓout : N→N, which would be implicit in the discussions below (i.e., we assume that the random
oracles are all ℓout-oracles, the relations are evasive w.r.t. ℓout, etc.).
4.1 First Step
Definition. Let S = (G,S, V ) be a signature scheme (which may or may not use a random
oracle), and let R be any binary relation, which is evasive w.r.t. length function ℓout. Then, by
SR = (G,SR, VR) we denote the following modification of S which utilizes a random ℓout-oracle:
Modified signature, SOR (sk,msg), of message msg using signing key sk:
1. If (msg,O(msg))∈R, output (sk,msg).
2. Otherwise (i.e., (msg,O(msg)) 6∈R), output SO(sk,msg).
Modified verification, V OR (vk,msg, σ), of alleged signature σ to msg using verification key vk:
1. If (msg,O(msg))∈R then accept
2. Otherwise output V O(vk,msg, σ).
The key-generation algorithm, G, is the same as in the original scheme S. Item 1 in the sign-
ing/verification algorithms is a harmful modification to the original signature scheme. Yet, if R is
evasive, then it has little effect on the ideal system, and the behavior of the modified scheme is
“indistinguishable” from the original one. In particular,
Proposition 4.1 Suppose that R is evasive (w.r.t. ℓout) and that S is existentially unforgeable un-
der a chosen message attack in the Random Oracle Model. Then SR is also existentially unforgeable
under a chosen message attack in the Random Oracle Model.
Proof: The intuition is that since R is evasive, it is infeasible for the forger to find a message
m so that (m,O(m)) ∈ R. Thus, a forgery of the modified scheme must be due to Item (2), which
yields a breaking of the original scheme.
9 Alternatively, we could use an ‘ordinary’ signature scheme, but then our Theorem 4.4 would be conditioned on
the existence of one-way functions.
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Formally, let AR be an adversary who mounts an adaptive chosen message attack on SR, and
whose success probability in obtaining an existential forgery (in the Random Oracle Model) is
ǫfrg = ǫfrg(k). Assume, toward contradiction, that ǫfrg is not negligible in the security parameter k.
Denote by REL the event in which during an execution of AR, it hands out a message m for
which (m,O(m)) ∈ R (either as a query to the signer during the chosen message attack, or as
the message for which it found a forgery at the end), and let ǫrel = ǫrel(k) be the probability of
that event. Using the hypothesis that R is evasive, we prove that ǫrel is negligible in the security
parameter k. Suppose, to the contrary, that ǫrel is not negligible. Then, we can try to efficiently
find pairs (x,O(x)) ∈ R by choosing a key-pair for S, and then implementing the attack, playing
the role of both the signer algorithm and the adversary AR. With probability ǫrel, one of AR’s
messages during this attack satisfies (m,O(m))∈R, so just choosing at random one message that
was used and outputting it yields a success probability of ǫrel/q (with q being the number of different
messages that are used in the attack). If ǫrel is not negligible, then neither is ǫrel/q, contradicting
the evasiveness of R.
It is clear that barring the event REL, the execution of AR against the original scheme S would
be identical to its execution against SR. Hence the probability that AR succeeds in obtaining an
existential forgery against S is at least ǫfrg − ǫrel. Since ǫrel is negligible, and ǫfrg is not, then AR’s
probability of obtaining an existential forgery against S is also not negligible, contradicting the
assumed security of S.
The modification enables to break the modified scheme when implemented with a real ensemble F ,
in the case where R is the relation RF from Proposition 3.4. Indeed, as corollary to Propositions 3.4
and 4.1, we immediately obtain:
Corollary 4.2 For every efficiently computable ℓout-ensemble F , there exists a signature scheme
that is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack in the Random Oracle Model, yet
when implemented with F , the resulting scheme is totally breakable under an adaptive chosen mes-
sage attack, and existentially forgeable under a key-only attack.
Proof: When we use an ensemble F to implement the random oracle in the scheme SR, we obtain
the following real scheme (which we denote S ′R = (G
′, S′R, V
′
R)):
G′(1k): Uniformly pick s ∈ {0, 1}k , set (sk, vk) ← Gfs(1k), and output (〈sk, s〉, 〈vk, s〉).
S′R(〈sk, s〉,msg): Output S
fs
R (sk,msg).
V ′R(〈vk, s〉,msg, σ): Output V
fs
R (vk,msg, σ).
Consider now what happens when we use the ensemble F to implement the the scheme SRF (recall
the definition of RF from Eq. (1)). Since RF is evasive, then from Proposition 4.1 we infer that the
SRF is secure in the Random Oracle Model. However, when we use the ensemble F to implement
the scheme, the seed s becomes part of the public verification-key, and hence is known to the
adversary. The adversary can simply output the pair (s, ǫ), which will be accepted by V ′
RF
as
a valid message-signature pair (since (s, fs(s)) ∈ R
F ). Hence, the adversary achieves existential
forgery (of S ′
RF
) under key-only attack. Alternatively, the adversary can ask the legitimate signer
for a signature on s, hence obtaining the secret signing-key (i.e., total forgery).
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4.2 Second Step
Enumeration. For this (and the next) subsection we need an enumeration of all efficiently com-
putable function ensembles. Such enumeration is achieved via an enumeration of all polynomial-
time algorithms (i.e., candidates for evaluation algorithms of such ensembles). Several standard
technicalities arise. First, enumerating all polynomial-time algorithms is problematic since there
is no single polynomial that bounds the running time of all these algorithms. Instead, we fix
an arbitrary super-polynomial proper complexity function10, t : N→ N (e.g., t(n) = nlogn), and
enumerate all algorithms of running-time bounded by t. The latter is done by enumerating all
possible algorithms, and modifying each algorithm by adding a time-out mechanism that termi-
nates the execution in case more than t(|input|) steps are taken. This modification does not effect
the polynomial-time algorithms. Also, since we are interested in enumerating ℓout-ensembles, we
modify each function by viewing its seed as a pair 〈s, x〉 (using some standard parsing rule11) and
padding or truncating its output to length ℓout(|s|). Again, this modification has no effect on the
ℓout-ensembles.
Let us denote by F i the ith function ensemble according to the above enumeration, and denote
by f is the function indexed by s from the ensemble F
i. Below we again use some standard rule for
parsing a string α as a pair 〈i, s〉 and viewing it as a description of the function f is.
Universal ensemble. Let U = {Uk}k∈N denote the “universal function ensemble” that is induced
by the enumeration above, namely Uk = {u〈i,s〉}〈i,s〉∈{0,1}k and u〈i,s〉(x) = f
i
s(x). There exists a
machine that computes the universal ensemble U and works in slightly super-polynomial time, t.
Universal relation. Denote by RU the universal relation that is defined with respect to the
universal ensemble U similarly to the way that RF is defined with respect to any ensemble F . That
is:
RU
def
=
⋃
k
{(
〈i, s〉, f is(〈i, s〉)
)
: 〈i, s〉 ∈ {0, 1}k
}
Or, in other words:
(x, y) ∈ RU ⇐⇒
y = ux(x)
(i.e., x = 〈i, s〉 and y = f is(x))
Modified signature scheme. Let S = (G,S, V ) be a signature scheme (as above). We then
denote by Su = (G,Su, Vu) the modified signature scheme that is derived by using R
U in place of
R in the previous construction. Specifically:
SOu (sk,msg)
def
=
1. If (msg,O(msg)) ∈ RU (i.e., if msg = 〈i, s〉 and O(msg) = f is(msg)) then output (sk,msg).
2. Otherwise, output SO(sk,msg)
V Ou (vk,msg, σ)
def
=
1. If (msg,O(msg)) ∈ RU then accept.
2. Otherwise, output V O(vk,msg, σ).
10 Recall that t(n) is a proper complexity function (or time-constructible) if there exists a machine that computes
t(n) and works in time O(t(n)). This technical requirement is needed to ensure that the enumeration itself is
computable in time O(t(n)).
11 For example, using a prefix-free code C, we can encode a pair (s, x) by C(s) concatenated with x.
14
We note that since these signature and verification algorithms need to compute U , they both run
in time O(t), which is slightly super-polynomial.
Proposition 4.3 Suppose that S is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack in the
Random Oracle Model. Then Su is also existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack in
the Random Oracle Model, but implementing it with any function ensemble yields a scheme that is
totally breakable under chosen message attack and existentially forgeable under key-only attack.
Proof: Since RU is evasive, then from Proposition 4.1 it follows that Su is secure in the Random
Oracle Model. On the other hand, suppose that one tries to replace the random oracle in the
scheme by an ensemble F i (where i be the index in the enumeration). An adversary, given a seed s
of a function in F i can then set msg = 〈i, s〉 and output the pair (msg, ǫ), which would be accepted
as a valid message-signature pair by Vu. Alternatively, it can ask the signer for a signature on this
message msg, and so obtain the secret signing-key.
4.3 Third step
We now use CS-proofs to construct a new signature scheme that works in the Random Oracle
Model. This construction is similar to the one in Subsection 4.2, except that instead of checking
that (msg,O(msg)) ∈ RU , the signer/verifier gets a CS-proof of that claim, and it only needs to
verify the validity of that proof. Since verifying the validity of a CS-proof can be done much more
efficiently than checking the claim “from scratch”, the signing and verifications algorithms in the
new scheme may work in polynomial time. On the other hand, when the scheme is implemented
using the function ensemble F i, supplying the adequate CS-proof (i.e., for (msg, f is(msg)) ∈ R
U )
only requires polynomial-time (i.e., time polynomial in the time it takes to evaluate f is). This yields
the following:
Theorem 4.4 There exists a signature scheme that is existentially unforgeable under a chosen
message attack in the Random Oracle Model, but such that when implemented with any function
ensemble, the resulting scheme is existentially forgeable using key-only attack and totally breakable
under chosen message attack.
We note again that unlike the “signature scheme” presented in Subsection 4.2, the signature scheme
presented below works in polynomial-time.
Proof: Below we describe such a signature scheme. For this construction we use the following
ingredients.
• S = (G,S, V ) is a signature scheme, operating in the Random Oracle Model, that is existen-
tially unforgeable under a chosen message attack.
• A fixed (and easily computable) parsing rule which interpret messages as triples of strings
msg = 〈i, s, π〉.
• The algorithms Prv and Ver of a CS-proof system, as described in Section 2.2 above.
• Access to three independent random oracles. This is very easy to achieve given access to one
oracle O; specifically, by setting O′(x)
def
= O(01x), O′′(x)
def
= O(10x) and O′′′(x)
def
= O(11x).
Below we use oracle O′′′ for the basic scheme S, oracle O′′ for the CS-proofs, and oracle O′
for our evasive relation. We note that if O is an ℓout-oracle, then so are O
′,O′′ and O′′′.
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• The universal function ensemble U from Subsection 4.2, with proper complexity bound t(n) =
nlogn. We denote by MU the universal machine that decides the relation R
U . That is, on
input (〈i, s〉, y), machineMU invokes the i
th evaluation algorithm, and accepts if f is(〈i, s〉) = y.
We note that MU works in time t in the worst case. More importantly, if F
i is a function
ensemble that can be computed in time pi(·) (where pi is some polynomial), then for any
strings s, y, on input (〈i, s〉, y), machine MU works for only poly(|i|) · pi(|s|) many steps.
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Using all the above, we describe an ideal signature scheme S ′u = (G,S
′
u, V
′
u). As usual, the key
generation algorithm, G, remains unchanged. The signature and verification algorithms proceed as
follows.
S′u
O(sk,msg)
def
=
1. Parse msg as 〈i, s, π〉, and set x = 〈i, s〉 and y = O′(x). Let n = |(x, y)|.
2. Apply VerO
′′
to verify whether π is a valid CS-proof, with respect to the oracle O′′ and
security parameter 1n+k, for the claim that the machine MU accepts the input (x, y)
within time t(n).
(The punch-line is that we do not directly check whether the machine MU accepts the
input (x, y) within time t(n), but rather only if π is a valid CS-proof of this claim.
Although t(n) = nlogn, this CS-proof can be verified in polynomial-time.)
3. If π is a valid proof, then output (sk,msg).
4. Otherwise, output SO
′′′
(sk,msg).
V ′u
O(vk,msg, σ)
def
=
1+2. As above
3. If π is a valid proof, then accept
4. Otherwise, output V O
′′′
(vk,msg, σ).
The computation required in Item 2 of the signature and verification algorithms can be executed
in polynomial-time. The reason being that (by definition) verifying a CS-proof can be done in
polynomial-time, provided the statement can be decided in at most exponential time (which is the
case here since we have t(n) = O(nlogn)). It is also easy to see that for every pair (sk, vk) output
by G, and for every msg and every O, the string S′u
O(sk,msg) constitutes a valid signature of msg
relative to vk and the oracle O.
To show that the scheme is secure in the Random Oracle Model, we first observe that on
security parameter 1k it is infeasible to find a string x so that (x,O′(x)) ∈ RU , since RU is evasive.
By Proposition 2.8, it is also infeasible to find (x, π) such that (x,O′(x)) 6∈ RU and yet π is a
valid CS-proof of the contrary relative to O′′ (with security parameter 1|x|+ℓout(k)+k). Thus, it is
infeasible for a polynomial-time adversary to find a message that would pass the test on Item 2 of
the signature/verification algorithms above, and so we infer that the modified signature is secure
in the Random Oracle Model.
We now show that for every candidate implementation, F , there exists a polynomial-time
adversary effecting total break via a chosen message attack (or, analogously, an existential forgery
via a “key only” attack). First, for each function fs ∈ F , denote f
′
s(x)
def
= fs(01x), f
′′
s (x)
def
= fs(10x),
and f ′′′s (x)
def
= fs(11x). Then denote by F
′ the ensemble of the f ′s functions.
12 The point is merely that, for every fixed i, the expression poly(|i|) · pi(|s|) is bounded by a polynomial in |s|.
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Suppose that F ′ is the ith function ensemble in the enumeration mentioned above, namely
F ′ = F i. Given a randomly chosen k-bit seed s, the adversary generate a message msg = 〈i, s, π〉
so that π is a CS-proof (w.r.t the adequate security parameter) for the true statement that MU
accepts the input (x, y) within t(|x| + |y|) steps, where x = 〈i, s〉 and y = f ′s(x). Recall that the
above statement is indeed true (since f ′s ≡ f
i
s), and hence the adversary can generate a proof for it
in time which is polynomial in the time that it takes to compute f is. (By the perfect completeness
property of the CS-proof system, the ability to prove correct statements holds for any choice of
the random oracle, and in particular when it is equal to f ′′s .) Since this adversary is specifically
designed to break the scheme in which the random oracle is implemented by F , then the index i –
which depends only on the choice of F – can be incorporated into the program of this adversary.
By the efficiency condition of CS-proofs, it is possible to find π (given an oracle access to f ′′s )
in time polynomial in the time that it takes MU to accept the input (x, y). Since F
i is polynomial-
time computable, then MU works on the input (x, y) = (〈i, s〉, y) in polynomial time, and thus the
described adversary also operates in polynomial-time.
By construction of the modified verification algorithm, ǫ is a valid signature on msg = 〈i, s, π〉,
and so existential forgery is feasible a-priori. Furthermore, requesting the signer to sign the message
msg yields the signing key, and thus total forgery.
Remark 4.5 It is immaterial for the above argument whether CS-proofs can be implemented in
the “real world” (i.e., without access to random oracles). Specifically, it doesn’t matter if one can
cheat when the oracle is substituted by a candidate function ensemble, as in this case (i.e., in the
real world implementation) it is sufficient for the adversary to invoke the proof system on valid
statements. We do rely, however, on the perfect completeness of CS-proofs that implies that valid
statements can be proven for any possible choice of oracle used in the proof system.
4.4 Encryption
The construction presented for signature schemes can be adapted to public-key encryption schemes
in a straightforward way, yielding the following theorem:13
Theorem 4.6
(a) Assume that there exists a public key encryption scheme that is semantically secure in the
Random Oracle Model. Then there exists a public key encryption scheme that is semantically
secure in the Random Oracle Model but is not semantically secure when implemented with
any function ensemble.14
(b) Assume that there exists a public key encryption scheme that is secure under adaptive chosen
ciphertext attack in the Random Oracle Model. Then there exists a scheme that is secure
under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the Random Oracle Model, but implementing it
with any function ensemble yields a scheme that is not semantically secure, and in which a
chosen ciphertext attack reveals the secret decryption key.
Proof: In this proof we use the same notations as in the proof of Theorem 4.4. Let E = (G,E,D)
be an encryption scheme that is semantically secure in the Random Oracle Model, and we modify
13 Similarly, we can adapt the argument to shared-key (aka private-key) encryption schemes. See Remark 4.8.
14Here we refer to semantic security as defined by Goldwasser and Micali in [15], and not to the seemingly weaker
definition presented in [11, 12]. Goldwasser and Micali allow the message space to depend on the public-key, whereas
this is not allowed in [11, 12].
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it to get another scheme E ′ = (G,E′,D′). The key generation algorithm remains unchanged, and
the encryption and decryption algorithms utilize a random oracle O, which is again viewed as three
oracles O′,O′′ and O′′′.
Modified encryption, E′ek
O(msg), of plaintext msg using the public encryption-key ek:
1. Parse msg as 〈i, s, π〉, set x = 〈i, s〉 and y = O′(x), and let n = |(x, y)|.
2. If π is a valid CS-proof, w.r.t oracle O′′ and security parameter 1n+k, for the assertion
that MU accepts the pair (x, y) within t(n) steps, then output (1,msg).
3. Otherwise (i.e., π is not such a proof), output (2, EO
′′′
ek (msg)).
Modified decryption, D′dk
O(c), of ciphertext c using the private decryption-key dk:
1. If c = (1, c′), output c′ and halt.
2. If c = (2, c′), output DO
′′′
dk (c
′) and halt.
3. If c = (3, c′) then parse c′ as 〈i, s, π〉, and set x = 〈i, s〉, y = O′(x), and n = |(x, y)|. If π
is a valid CS-proof, w.r.t oracle O′′ and security parameter 1n+k, for the assertion that
MU accepts the pair (x, y) within t(n) steps, then output dk and halt.
4. Otherwise output ǫ.
The efficiency of this scheme follows as before. It is also easy to see that for every pair (ek,dk)
output by G, and for every plaintext msg, the equality D′dk
O(E′ek
O(msg)) = msg holds for every
O. To show that the scheme is secure in the Random Oracle Model, we observe again that it
is infeasible to find a plaintext that satisfies the condition in Item 2 of the encryption algorithm
(resp., a ciphertext that satisfies the condition in Item 3 of the decryption algorithm). Thus, the
modified ideal encryption scheme (in the Random Oracle Model) inherits all security features of
the original scheme.
Similarly, to show that replacing the random oracle by any function ensemble yields an insecure
scheme, we again observe that for any such ensemble there exists an adversary who – given the
seed s – can generate a plaintext msg (resp., a ciphertext c) that satisfies the condition in Item 2
of the encryption algorithm (resp., the condition in Item 3 of the decryption algorithm). Hence,
such an adversary can identify when msg is being encrypted (thus violates semantic security), or
ask for a decryption of c, thus obtaining the secret decryption key.
Remark 4.7 As opposed to Theorem 4.4, here we need to make computational assumptions,
namely, that there exist schemes that are secure in the Random Oracle Model. (The result in [19]
imply that it is unlikely that such schemes are proven to exists without making any assumptions.)
Clearly, any scheme which is secure without random oracles is also secure in the Random Oracle
Model. Recall that the former exist, provided trapdoor permutations exist [15, 29].
Remark 4.8 The constructions presented above can be adapted to yield many analogous results.
For example, a result analogous to Theorem 4.6 holds for shared-key (aka private-key) encryption
schemes. In this case no computational assumptions are needed since secure shared-key encryption
is known to exist in the Random Oracle Model. Similarly, we can prove the existence of a CS-proof
in the Random Oracle Model that has no implementations (via any function ensemble). In fact, as
remarked in the Introduction, the same technique can be applied to practically any cryptographic
application.
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5 Restricted correlation intractability
Faced with the negative result of Theorem 3.4, one may explore restricted (and yet possibly useful)
versions of the correlation intractability property. One possibility is to put more stringent con-
straints on the use of the ensemble in a cryptographic scheme, and then to show that as long as
the ensemble is only used in this restricted manner, it is guaranteed to maintain some aspects of
correlation intractability.
In particular, notice that the proof of Theorem 3.4 relies heavily on the fact that the input to
fs can be as long as the seed s, so we can let the input to the function fs be equal to s. Thus, one
option would be to require that we only use fs on inputs that are shorter than s. Specifically, we
require that each function fs will only be applied to inputs of length ℓin(|s|), where ℓin : N→N is
some pre-specified function (e.g. ℓin(k) = k/2). The corresponding restricted notion of correlation
intractability is derived from Definition 3.2:
Definition 5.1 (restricted correlation intractability) Let ℓin, ℓout : N→N be length functions.
A machine M is called ℓin-respecting if |M(s)| = ℓin(|s|) for all s ∈ {0, 1}
∗.
• A binary relation R is evasive with respect to (ℓin, ℓout) if for any ℓin-respecting probabilistic
polynomial-time oracle machine M
Pr
O
[x←MO(1k), (x,O(x))∈R] = negl(k)
where O : {0, 1}ℓin(k) → {0, 1}ℓout(k) is a uniformly chosen function and negl(·) is a negligible
function.
• We say that an ℓout-ensemble F is (ℓin, ℓout)-restricted correlation intractable (or just ℓin-
correlation intractable, for short), if for every ℓin-respecting probabilistic polynomial-time
machine M and every evasive relation R w.r.t. (ℓin, ℓout), it holds that
Pr
s∈{0,1}k
[x←M(s), (x, fs(x)) ∈ R] = negl(k)
Weak ℓin-correlation intractability is defined analogously by considering only polynomial-time rec-
ognizable R’s.
The rest of this section is dedicated to demonstrating impossibility results for restricted corre-
lation intractable ensembles, in some cases. We also highlight cases where existence of restricted
correlation intractable ensembles is left as an open problem.
5.1 Negative results for short seeds
The proof ideas of Theorem 3.4 can be easily applied to rule out the existence of certain restricted
correlation intractable ensembles where the seed is too short.
Proposition 5.2
(a) If ℓin(k) ≥ k−O(log k) for infinitely many k’s, then there exists no ensemble that is (ℓin, ℓout)-
correlation intractable, even in the weak sense.
(b) If ℓin(k) + ℓout(k) ≥ k + ω(log k), there exists no ensemble that is (ℓin, ℓout)-correlation in-
tractable.
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Proof: The proof of (a) is a straightforward generalization of the proof of Theorem 3.4. Actually,
we need to consider two cases: the case ℓin(k) ≥ k and the case k − O(log k) ≤ ℓin(k) < k. In the
first case, we proceed as in the proof of Theorem 3.4 (except that we define RF
def
= {(x, fs(x)) : s ∈
{0, 1}∗, x = s0ℓin(|s|)−|s|}). In the second case, for every ensemble F , we define the relation
RF
def
= {(x, fxz(x)) : x, z ∈ {0, 1}
∗ , |x| = ℓin(|xz|)}
We show that RF is evasive by showing that, for every k ∈ N and x ∈ {0, 1}ℓin(k), there exist at
most polynomially (in k) many y’s such that (x, y) ∈ RF . This is the case since (x, y) ∈ RF implies
that there exists some z such that ℓin(|xz|) = |x| and y = fxz(x). But using the case hypothesis
we have |x| = ℓin(|xz|) ≥ |xz| − O(log |xz|), which implies that |z| = O(log(|xz|)) and hence also
|z| = O(log |x|). Next, using the other case hypothesis (i.e., k > ℓin(k) = |x|), we conclude that
|z| = O(log k). Therefore, there could be at most polynomially many such z’s, and so the upper
bound on the number of y’s paired with x follows. The evasiveness of RF as well as the assertion
that RF is polynomial-time computable follow (assuming that the function ℓin itself is polynomial-
time computable). On the other hand, consider the machine M that, on input s, outputs the
ℓin(|s|)-bit prefix of s. Then, for every s ∈ {0, 1}
∗, we have (M(s), fs(M(s))) ∈ R
F .
For the proof of (b), assume that ℓin(k) < k (for all but finitely many k’s). We start by defining
the “inverse” of the ℓin function
ℓ−1in (n)
def
= min{k : ℓin(k) = n}
(where, in case there exists no k such that ℓin(k) = n, we define ℓ
−1
in (n) = 0). By definition it
follows that k ≥ ℓ−1in (ℓin(k)), for all k’s (because k belongs to the set {k
′ : ℓin(k
′) = ℓin(k)}), and
that ℓin(ℓ
−1
in (n)) = n, whenever there exists some k for which n = ℓin(k). Next we define
RF
def
=
{
(x, fxz(x)) : x, z ∈ {0, 1}
∗ , |x|+ |z| = ℓ−1in (|x|)
}
This relation is well defined since, by the conditions on the lengths of x and z, we have ℓin(|xz|) =
ℓin(ℓ
−1
in (|x|)) = |x| and so the function fxz is indeed defined on the input x. In case ℓin(k) ≤
k − ω(log k), this relation may not be polynomial-time recognizable. Still, it is evasive w.r.t.
(ℓin, ℓout), since with security parameter k we have for every x ∈ {0, 1}
ℓin(k)
∣∣∣{y ∈ {0, 1}ℓout(k) : (x, y) ∈ RF}∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣{fxz(x) : |z| = ℓ−1in (ℓin(k))− ℓin(k)} ∩ {0, 1}ℓout(k)∣∣∣
≤ 2ℓ
−1
in (ℓin(k))−ℓin(k)
≤ 2k−ℓin(k)
Using k−ℓin(k) ≤ ℓout(k)−ω(log k), we conclude that the set of y’s paired with x forms a negligible
fraction of {0, 1}ℓout(k), and so that RF is evasive. Again, the machine M , that on input s outputs
the ℓin(|s|)-bit prefix of s, satisfies (M(s), fs(M(s))) ∈ R
F , for all s’s.
Open Problems: Proposition 5.2 still leaves open the question of existence of (ℓin, ℓout)-restricted
correlation intractable ensembles, for the case ℓin(k) + ℓout(k) < k +O(log k).
15 We believe that it
is interesting to resolve the situation either way: Either provide negative results also for the above
15 In fact such ensembles do exist in case k ≥ 2ℓin(k) · ℓout(k) (since the seed may be used to directly specify all the
function’s values), but we dismiss this trivial and useless case.
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special case, or provide a plausible construction. Also open is the sub-case where ℓin(k)+ ℓout(k) =
k+ω(log k) but one considers only weak (ℓin, ℓout)-restricted correlation intractability. (Recall that
Case (b) of Proposition 5.2 is proven using relations which are not known to be polynomial-time
recognizable.)
We comment that even if restricted correlation intractable ensembles exist, then they are very
non-robust constructs. For example, even if the ensemble F = {fs : |s| = k}k is correlation in-
tractable with respect to some length functions (ℓin, ℓout), the ensemble that is obtained by applying
many independent copies of F and concatenating the results may not be. That is, for m :N→N,
define
Fm
def
= {f ′〈s1,...,sm(k)〉 : |s1| = · · · = |sm(k)| = k}k∈N , (2)
where, for 〈x1, ..., xm(k)〉 ∈ {0, 1}
m(k)·ℓin(k),
f ′〈s1,...,sm(k)〉(〈x1, ..., xm(k)〉)
def
= 〈fs1(x1), ...., fsm(k)(xm(k))〉 . (3)
Then, for sufficiently large m (e.g., m(k) ≥ k/ℓin(k) will do), the “direct product” ensemble F
m is
not correlation intractable (not even in the restricted sense). That is,
Proposition 5.3 Let ℓin, ℓout : N→N be length functions so that ℓin(k) ≤ k, and let m : N→N be
a polynomially-bounded function so that m(k) ≥ k/ℓin(k). Let F be an arbitrary function ensemble,
and Fm be as defined in Eq. (2) and (3). Then, Fm is not correlation intractable, not even in the
(ℓmin , ℓ
m
out)-restricted sense, where ℓ
m
in(m(k) · k)
def
= m(k) · ℓin(k) and ℓ
m
out(m(k) · k)
def
= m(k) · ℓout(k).
Proof: We assume, for simplicity thatm(k) = k/ℓin(k) (and so ℓin(k) = k/m(k) and ℓ
m
in(m(k)·k) =
k). Given Fm as stated, we again adapt the proof of Theorem 3.4. This time, using ℓin(k) ≤ k, we
define the relation
RF
m def
=
⋃
k
{
(s, 〈fs(s
′), t〉) : |s| = k, s′ is the ℓin(k)-prefix of s, |t| = (m(k) − 1) · ℓout(k)
}
Notice that in this definition we have |s| = k
ℓin(k)
· ℓin(k) = m(k) · ℓin(k) = ℓ
m
in(m(k) · k), and also
|fs(s
′)|+ |t| = m(k) · ℓout(k) = ℓ
m
out(m(k) · k), so this relation is indeed (ℓ
m
in , ℓ
m
out)-restricted.
Again, it is easy to see that RF is polynomial-time recognizable, and it is evasive since every
string x ∈ {0, 1}k is coupled with at most a 2−ℓout(k) fraction of the possible (m(k) ·ℓout(k))-bit long
strings, and ℓout(k) = ω(log k) = ω(log(m(k) · k)). (Here we use the hypothesis m(k) = poly(k).)
On the other hand, consider a (real-life) adversary that given the seed s = 〈s1, ..., sm(k)〉 ∈
{0, 1}m(k)·k for the function f ′〈s1,...,sm(k)〉, sets the input to this function to be equal to s1. Denoting
the ℓin(k)-prefix of s1 (equiv., of s) by s
′
1, it follows that fs1(s
′
1) is a prefix of f
′
〈s1,...,sm(k)〉
(s1) and
so (s1, f
′
〈s1,....,sm(k)〉
(s1)) ∈ R
F . Thus, this real-life adversary violates the (restricted) correlation
intractability of Fm.
5.2 Correlation intractability for multiple invocations
Recall that Proposition 5.2 does not rule out the existence of restricted ensembles having seeds
that are longer than the sum of lengths of their inputs and outputs. However, even for this
special case the only thing that is not ruled out is a narrow definition that refers to forming
rare relationships between a single input-output pair. In fact, if one generalizes the definition of
correlation intractability so as to consider evasive relations over unbounded sequences of inputs
and outputs, then the negative result in Proposition 5.2 can be extended for arbitrary ℓin and ℓout.
That is,
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Definition 5.4 (multi-invocation restricted correlation intractability) Let ℓin, ℓout : N→N
be length functions. We consider probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machines which on input 1k
have oracle access to a function O : {0, 1}ℓin(k) → {0, 1}ℓout(k).
• A relation R over pairs of binary sequences is evasive with respect to (ℓin, ℓout) (or (ℓin, ℓout)-
evasive) if for any probabilistic polynomial-time machine M as above it holds that
Pr
O
[
(x1, ..., xm)←M
O(1k) ;
|x1| = . . . = |xm| = ℓin(k)
and ((x1, ..., xm), (O(x1), ...,O(xm))∈R
]
= negl(k)
As usual, O : {0, 1}ℓin(k) → {0, 1}ℓout(k) is a uniformly chosen function.
• We say that an ℓout-ensemble F is (ℓin, ℓout)-restricted multi-invocation correlation intractable
(or just ℓin-multi-invocation correlation intractable, for short), if for every (ℓin, ℓout)-evasive
relation R and every probabilistic polynomial-time machine M it holds that
Pr
s∈{0,1}k
[
(x1, ..., xm)←M(s) ;
|x1| = . . . = |xm| = ℓin(k)
and ((x1, ..., xm), (fs(x1), ..., fs(xm))∈R
]
= negl(k)
Proposition 5.5 Let ℓin, ℓout : N→N be arbitrary length functions, with ℓin(k) ≥ 2 + log k and
ℓout(k) ≥ 1. Then there exist no (ℓin, ℓout)-restricted multi-invocation correlation intractable func-
tion ensembles.
Proof: For simplicity, we consider first the case ℓout(k) ≥ 2. Let F be an ℓout-ensemble. Adapting
the proof of Theorem 3.4, we define the relation
RF
def
=
⋃
k
{
((x1, . . . , xk), (fs(x1), . . . , fs(xk))) :
xi = (i, si), with si ∈ {0, 1}
and s = s1 . . . sk
}
(Notice that since ℓin(k) > 1 + log k, the xi’s are indeed in the range of the function fs.) Clearly,
this relation is polynomial-time recognizable. To see that this relation is evasive, notice that for
any fixed k-bit seed s = s1 . . . sk, we have
Pr
O
[O(i, si) = fs(i, si) for i = 1 . . . k] = 2
−ℓout(k)·k
Hence, the probability that there exists a seed s for which O(i, si) = fs(i, si) holds, for i = 1, ..., k,
is at most 2k · 2−ℓout(k)·k ≤ 2−k. It follows that
Pr
O
[∃x1, ..., xk ((x1, . . . , xk), (O(x1), . . . ,O(xk))) ∈ R
F ] ≤ 2−k
However, the corresponding multi-invocation restricted correlation intractability condition does not
hold: For any s = s1 . . . sk ∈ {0, 1}
k , setting xi = (i, si) we get ((x1, ..., xk), (fs(x1), ..., fs(xk))) ∈
RF .
To rule out the case ℓout(k) = 1, we redefine R
F so that ((x1, ..., x2k), (fs(x1), ..., fs(x2k))) ∈ R
F
if xi = (i, si) for i = 1, ..., k and xi = (i, 0) for i = k + 1, ..., 2k.
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Discussion: Propositions 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5 demonstrate that there is only a very narrow mar-
gin in which strict correlation-intractability may be used. Still, even ensembles that are (strict)
correlation-intractable with respect to relations of a-priori bounded total length (of input-output
sequences) may be useful in some applications. Typically, this may hold in applications where
number of invocations of the cryptosystem is a-priori bounded (or where the security of the system
depends only on an a-priori bounded partial history of invocations; e.g., the current one). We note
that the Fiat-Shamir heuristic for transforming interactive identification protocols into signature
schemes [9] does not fall into the above category, since the function’s seed needs to be fixed with the
public key, and used for signing polynomially many messages, where the polynomial is not a-priori
known.
5.3 Correlation intractability for given, polynomial-time relations
In all our negative results, the evasive relation demonstrating that a certain function ensemble is
not correlation-intractable is more complex than the function ensemble itself. A natural restriction
on correlation-intractability is to require that it holds only for relations recognizable within certain
fixed polynomial time bounds (or some fixed space bound), and allowing the function ensemble to
have a more complex polynomial-time evaluation algorithm. We stress that, in both the definition
of evasiveness and correlation-intractability, the adversary that generates the inputs to the relation
is allowed arbitrary (polynomial) running time; this time may be larger than both the time to
evaluate the function ensemble and the time to evaluate the relation. Such a restricted notion of
correlation-intractability may suffice for some applications, and it would be interesting to determine
whether function ensembles satisfying it do exist. Partial results in this direction were obtained by
Nissim [24] and are described next:
Proposition 5.6 ([24]) Let ℓin, ℓout : N→N be arbitrary length functions, with k ≥ ℓout(k) ·
(ℓin(k)+ω(log k)).
16 Then, for every binary relation R that is evasive with respect to (ℓin, ℓout) and
recognizable in polynomial-time, there exists a function ensemble FR = {fs} that is correlation-
intractable with respect to R; that is, for every ℓin-respecting probabilistic polynomial-time machine
M it holds that
Pr
s∈{0,1}k
[x←M(s), (x, fs(x)) ∈ R] = negl(k)
We note that the postulated construction uses a seed length that is longer than ℓin + ℓout. Thus,
this positive result capitalizes on both restrictions discussed above (i.e., both the length and the
complexity restrictions).
Proof: Let t = ℓin(k) + ω(log k). For every seed s = (s1, ..., st) ∈ {0, 1}
t·ℓout(k), we define
fs : {0, 1}
ℓin(k) → {0, 1}ℓout(k) so that fs1,...,st(x) equals si if i is the smallest integer such that
(x, si) 6∈ R. In case (x, si) ∈ R holds for all i’s, we define fs1,...,st(x) arbitrarily.
Let R(x)
def
= {y : (x, y) ∈ R}, and Sk
def
= {x ∈ {0, 1}ℓin(k) : |R(x)| ≤ 2ℓout(k)/2} (S stands for
“Small image”). Since R is evasive, it is infeasible to find an x ∈ {0, 1}ℓin(k) not in Sk. Thus, for
every probabilistic polynomial-time M , Prs∈{0,1}k [M(s) 6∈ Sk] = negl(k). On the other hand, the
probability that such M(s) outputs an x ∈ Sk so that (x, fs(x)) ∈ R is bounded above by
17
Pr
s∈{0,1}k
[∃x ∈ Sk s.t. (x, fs(x)) ∈ R] ≤ Pr
s∈{0,1}k
[∃x ∈ Sk ∀i (x, si) ∈ R]
16 Recall that (ℓin, ℓout)-restricted correlation-intractable ensembles exist for k ≥ 2
ℓin(k) · ℓout(k); see Footnote 15.
17 For the first inequality, we use the fact that if there exists an i such that (x, si) 6∈ R then (x, fs(x)) 6∈ R.
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≤ |Sk| ·max
x∈Sk
{
Pr
s
[∀i (x, si) ∈ R]
}
≤ 2ℓin(k) · (1/2)t = negl(k)
Combining the two cases, the proposition follows.
Considering the notion of multi-invocation correlation-intractability when restricting the com-
plexity of the relation (and allowing the function ensemble to be more complex), Nissim has obtained
another impossibility result [24]:
Proposition 5.7 ([24]) There exists an evasive relation R that is recognizable in polynomial-time
so that no function ensemble F = {fs} is multi-invocation correlation-intractable with respect to R;
that is, for every function ensemble F = {fs} there exists a polynomial-time machine M such that
Pr
s
[(x1, ..., xt)←M(s) ; ((x1, ..., xt), (fs(x1), ..., fs(xt))∈R ] = 1
Furthermore, for some universal polynomial p, which is independent of F , it holds that t < p(|x1|).
We stress that the above assertion includes even function ensembles that have (polynomial-time)
evaluation algorithms of running time greater than the time it takes to recognize t-tuples of corre-
sponding length is the relation. Furthermore, it includes function ensembles having seeds of length
exceeding the total length of pairs in the relation.
Proof Sketch: We follow the ideas underlying the proof of Theorem 4.4. Specifically, using the
universal machine MU and the algorithms (Prv and Ver) of a CS-proof system, we consider a
relation R that contains pairs of binary sequences, so that ((x, π, q1..., qm), (y, φ, a1..., am)) ∈ R if
these strings describe an accepting execution of the CS-verifier with respect to machine MU . That
is, we require that the following conditions hold:
1. All the strings y, φ, a1..., am have the same length. Below we denote this length by ℓout,
|y| = |φ| = |a1| = · · · = |am| = ℓout.
2. The string π is an alleged CS-proof for the assertion that the machine MU accepts the input
(x, y) within t(n) = nlogn steps, where n
def
= |x|+ |y|.
3. Given access to an oracle that on queries qi returns answers ai, and given security parameter
n+ ℓout and input w = (〈MU 〉, (x, y), t(n)), the CS verifier Ver accepts the CS-proof π after
querying the oracle on q1 . . . qm (in this order), and obtaining the corresponding answers
a1 . . . am.
(Here we use the fact that the verifier is deterministic, and thus its queries are determined
by its input and the answers to previous queries.)
Recall that, by definition, m is bounded by a fixed polynomial in n. In fact, in Micali’s con-
struction [21], m is poly-logarithmic in n. We comment that, assuming the existence of suitable
collision-intractable hash functions, one may obtain m = 1 (cf. [22]. In addition, one may need to
make some minor modification in the above construction.)
As in the proof of Theorem 4.4, using the computational soundness of CS-proofs, it can be shown
that the above relation is evasive. By the additional efficiency conditions of CS-proofs, it follows that
the relation is recognizable in polynomial-time. On the other hand, as in the proof of Theorem 4.4,
for every function ensemble F i = {f is} there exists a polynomial-time adversary A, that on input s
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produces a sequence (x, π, q1, ..., qm) so that ((x, π, q1, ..., qm), (f
i
s(x), f
i
s(π), f
i
s(q1), ..., f
i
s(qm))) ∈ R.
This is done as follows: First A sets x = 〈i, s〉, y = f is(x), and n
def
= |x|+ |y|. Next, A constructs a
CS-proof that indeedMU accepts (x, y) within n
logn steps, and sets π to equal this proof. (This step
takes time polynomial in the evaluation time of f is(x).) Note that since (x, y) is indeed accepted by
MU (in less than n
logn steps), the verifier accept π as a proof no matter how the oracle is determined
(since perfect completeness holds). Finally, the adversary invokes the verifier (on input consisting
mainly of (x, y) and π), and (by emulating the oracle) determines interactively the oracle queries
and answers of the verifier; that is, for every j = 1, ...,m, the adversary determines the jth query
made by the verifier, sets qj to equal this query, and provides the verifier with the answer f
i
s(qj).
2
6 Conclusions
The authors have different opinions regarding the Random Oracle Methodology. Rather than trying
to strike a mild compromise, we prefer to present our disagreements in the most controversial form.
6.1 Ran’s Conclusions
Real-life cryptographic applications are complex objects. On top of the “cryptographic core,”
these applications typically involve numerous networking protocols, several other applications, user-
interfaces, and in fact also an entire operating-system. The security of an application depends on
the security of all these components operating in unison. Thus, in principle, the best way to gain
assurance in the security of a cryptographic application is to analyze it as a single unit, bones and
feathers included.
However, analyzing an entire system is prohibitively complex. Moreover, we often feel that
the “essence” of a cryptographic application can be presented in a relatively simple way without
getting into many details, which, we feel, are “extraneous” to the actual security. Consequently,
we often make abstractions of a cryptographic application by leaving many details “outside the
model”. Nonetheless, some caution is needed when making abstractions: While good abstractions
are important and useful, bad abstractions can be dangerous and misleading. Thus, it is crucial to
make sure that one uses a sound abstraction, or one that helps to distinguish between good and
bad applications.
One popular abstraction is to treat computers in a network as interactive Turing machines
who run one specific (and relatively simple) algorithm, and assume that delivery of messages is
done simply by having one machine write values on the tapes of another machine. We are then
satisfied with defining and analyzing security of a protocol in this abstract model. In other words,
this abstraction implicitly uses the following methodology (which I’ll call the “Interactive Turing
machine methodology”): Design and analyze a protocol in the “idealized system” (i.e., using Turing
machines). Next, come up with an “implementation” of the idealized protocol by adding the
components that deal with the networking protocols, the operating system, the user interfaces, etc.
Now, “hope” that the implementation is indeed secure.
We widely believe that this methodology is sound, in the sense that if an idealized protocol is
secure then there exist secure implementations of it. Furthermore, security of an idealized protocol
is a good predictor for the feasibility of finding a good implementation to it. (Of course, finding
secure implementations to secure idealized protocols is a far-from-trivial task, and there is probably
no single automatic method for securely implementing any idealized protocol. But this does not
undermine the soundness of the “Interactive Turing machine methodology”.)
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The Random Oracle Methodology is, in essence, another proposed abstraction of cryptographic
applications. It too proposes to define and analyze security of protocols in an idealized model, then
perform some transformation that is “outside the formal model”, and now “hope” that the resulting
implementation is secure. At first glance it looks like a great abstraction: It does away with specific
implementation issues of “cryptographic hash functions” and concentrates on designing protocols
assuming that an “ideal hash function” is available. Indeed, protocols that were designed using
this methodology are remarkably simple and efficient, while resisting all known attacks.
However, as shown in this work, and in sharp contrast to the “Interactive Turing machine
methodology”, the Random Oracle Methodology is not sound. Furthermore, it is a bad predictor
to the security of implementations: Not only do there exist idealized protocols that have no secure
implementations, practically any idealized protocol can be slightly “tweaked” so that the tweaked
protocol remains just as secure in the idealized model, but has no secure implementations. This
leaves us no choice but concluding that, in spite of its apparent successes, the Random Oracle
Methodology is a bad abstraction of protocols for the purpose of analyzing security.
The loss of reductions to hard problems. The above argument should provide sufficient
motivation to be wary of security analyses in the Random Oracle Model. Nonetheless, let us
highlight the following additional disturbing aspect of such analysis.
One of the great contributions of complexity-based modern cryptography, developed in the past
quarter of a century, is the ability to base the security of many varied protocols on a small number of
well-defined and well-studied complexity assumptions. Furthermore, typically the proof of security
of a protocol provides us with a method for transforming adversary that breaks the security of the
said protocol into an adversary that refutes one of the well-studied assumptions. In light of our
inability to prove security of protocols from scratch, this methodology provides us with the “next
best” evidence for the security of protocols.
The Random Oracle Methodology does away with these advantages. Assume that an idealized
protocol A is proven secure in the Random Oracle Model based on, say, the Diffie-Hellman assump-
tion, and that someone comes up with a way to break any implementation of A. This does not
necessarily mean that it is now possible to break Diffie-Hellman! Consequently, the reducibility
of the security of A to the hardness of Diffie-Hellman is void. This brings us back to a situation
where the security of each protocol is a “stand-alone” problem and is, in essence, unrelated to the
hardness of known problems.
Possible alternative directions. In spite of its shortcomings, the Random Oracle Methodology
seems to generate simple and efficient protocols against which no attacks are known. One possible
direction towards providing formal justification for some of these protocols is to identify useful,
special-purpose properties of the random oracle, which can be also provided by a fully specified
function (or function ensemble) and so yield secure implementations of certain useful ideal systems.
First steps in this direction were taken in [4, 6, 10]. Hopefully, future works will push this direction
further.
6.2 Oded’s Conclusions
My starting point is that within the domain of science, every deduction requires a rigorous justifica-
tion.18 In contrast, unjustified deductions should not be allowed; especially not in a subtle research
18 This does not disallow creative steps committed in the course of research, without proper justification. Such
unjustified steps are the fuel of progress. What I refer to are claims that are supposed to reflect valid facts. Such
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area such as Cryptography. Furthermore, one should refrain from making statements that are likely
to mislead the listener/reader, such as claiming a result in a restricted model while creating the
impression that it holds also in a less restricted model. The presentation of such a result should
clearly state the restrictions under which it holds, and refrain from creating the impression that the
result extends also to a case where these restrictions are waived (unless this is indeed true (and one
can prove it)). Needless to say, it is perfectly ok to conjecture that a restricted result extends also
to a case when these restrictions are waived, but the stature of such a statement (as a conjecture)
should be clear.
The above abstract discussion directly applies to security in the Random Oracle Model. Deduc-
ing that the security of a scheme in the Random Oracle Model means anything about the security
of its implementations, without proper justification, is clearly wrong.19 This should have been clear
also before the current work. It should have also been clear that no proper justification of deduction
from security in the Random Oracle Model to security of implementations has been given (so far).
The contributions of the current work are two-fold:
1. This work uncovers inherent difficulties in the project of providing conditions that would allow
(justifiable) deduction from security in the Random Oracle Model to security of implementa-
tions. Such a project could have proceeded by identifying properties that characterize proofs
of security in the Random Oracle Model, and (justifiably) deducing that the such schemes
maintain their security when implemented with ensembles satisfying these properties. The
problem with this project is that correlation intractability should have been (at the very least)
one of these properties, but (as we show) no function ensemble can satisfy it.
2. As stated above, deducing that the security of a scheme in the Random Oracle Model means
anything about the security of its implementations, without proper justification, is clearly
wrong. The current work presents concrete examples in which this unjustified deduction
leads to wrong conclusions. That is, it is shown that not only that unjustified deduction
regarding the Random Oracle Model may lead to wrong conclusions, but rather than in some
cases indeed this unjustified deduction does lead to wrong conclusions. Put in other words,
if one needs a concrete demonstration of the dangers of unjustified deduction when applied
to the Random Oracle Model, then this work provides it.
The bottom-line: It should be clear that the Random Oracle Methodology is not sound; that
is, the mere fact that a scheme is secure in the Random Oracle Model cannot be taken as evidence
(or indication) to the security of (possible) implementations of this scheme. Does this mean that
the Random Oracle Model is useless? Not necessarily: it may be useful as a test-bed (or as a sanity
check).20 Indeed, if the scheme does not perform well on the test-bed (resp., fails the sanity check)
then it should be dumped. But one should not draw wrong conclusions from the mere fact that a
scheme performs well on the test-bed (resp., passes the sanity check). In summary, the Random
Oracle Methodology is actually a method for ruling out some insecure designs, but this method is
not “complete” (i.e., it may fail to rule out insecure designs).21
claims should be fully justified, or offered as conjectures.
19 Using the Random Oracle Model as a justification to the feasibility of meeting some security requirements is
even “more wrong”.
20 This explains the fact the Random Oracle Methodology is in fact used in practice. In also explains why many
reasonable schemes, the security of which is still an open problem, are secure in the Random Oracle Model: good
suggestions should be expected to pass a sanity check.
21 Would I, personally, endorse this method is a different question. My answer is very much time-sensitive: Given
the current misconceptions regarding the Random Oracle Model, I would suggest not to include, in currently published
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6.3 Shai’s Conclusions
The negative results in this work (and in particular Theorems 4.4 and 4.6) leave me with an uneasy
feeling: adopting the view that a good theory should be able to explain “the real world”, I would
have liked theoretical results that explain the apparent success of the random oracle methodology
in devising useful, seemingly secure, cryptographic schemes. (Indeed, this was one of the original
motivations for this work.) Instead, in this work we show that security of cryptographic schemes
in the Random Oracle Model does not necessarily imply security in “the real world”. Trying to
resolve this apparent mismatch, one may come up with several different explanations. Some of
those are discussed below:
• The current success of this methodology is due to pure luck: all the current schemes that are
proven secure in the Random Oracle Model, happen to be secure also in the “real world” for
no reason. However, our “common sense” and sense of esthetics must lead us to reject such
explanation.
• The current apparent success is a mirage: some of the schemes that are proven secure in the
Random Oracle Model are not really secure, and attacks on them may be discovered in the
future.
This explanation seems a little more attractive than the previous one. After all, a security
proof in the Random Oracle Model eliminates a broad class of potential attacks (i.e., the ones
that would work also in the Random Oracle Model), and in many cases it seems that attacks
of this type are usually the ones that are easier to find. Hence, it makes sense that if there
exists a “real life” attack on a scheme which is secure in the Random Oracle Model, it may be
harder – and take longer – to find this attack. Still, the more time passes without published
attacks against “real life” schemes which are proven secure in the Random Oracle Model, the
less likely this explanation would become.
• Another possible explanation is that the random oracle methodology works for the current
published schemes, due to some specific features of these schemes that we are yet to identify.
That is, maybe it is possible to identify interesting classes of schemes, for which security in
the Random Oracle Model implies the existence of a secure implementation.22
Identifying such interesting classes, and proving the above implication, is an important – and
seemingly hard – research direction. (In fact, it even seems to be hard to identify classes
of schemes for which this implication makes a reasonable computational assumption.) To
appreciate the difficulty in proceeding towards this goal, recall that the techniques in the
work can be used to “tweak” almost any cryptographic scheme into one which is secure in the
Random Oracle Model but has no secure implementation. Hence, any classification as above
must be refined enough to separate the original scheme (for which we want to prove that
security in the Random Oracle Model implies security in the real world) from the “tweaked”
one (for which this implication does not hold).
My bottom line is that at the present time, the random oracle methodology seems to be a
very useful “engineering tool” for devising schemes. As a practical matter, I would much rather
work, proofs of security in the Random Oracle Model. My rationale is that the dangers of misconceptions (regarding
such proofs) seem to out-weight the gain of demonstrating that the scheme passed a sanity check. I hope that in the
future such misconceptions will be less prevailing, at which time it would be indeed recommended to report on the
result of a sanity check.
22One particularly silly example are schemes that do not use the oracle. Another, more interesting example, are
schemes that only use the “perfect one-way” property of the oracle; see [4, 6].
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see today’s standards built around schemes which are proven secure in the Random Oracle Model,
than around schemes for which no such proofs exist. The results in this paper, however, must serve
as a warning that security proof in the Random Oracle Model can never be thought of as the end
of the road. Proofs in the Random Oracle Model are useful in that they eliminate a broad class of
attacks, but they do not imply that other attacks cannot be found.
In terms of scientific research, our works clearly demonstrate that the random oracle method-
ology is not sound in general. My feeling is that our understanding of the relations between the
Random Oracle Model and the “real world” is very limited. As I said above, it would be very
interesting to identify special cases in which the random oracle methodology is sound. Similarly, it
would be interesting to see other, “less artificial”, examples where this methodology fails.
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